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I. In t r o d u c tio n
This Article is about the roles of the family in making health 
care decisions for incompetent patients. It argues that complex 
moral reasons call for the participation of families in decision 
making for incompetents. However, these moral reasons do not 
support a single model of the family’s role for all incompetents. 
Rather, they suggest important differences among the roles family 
members should play in decision making for different kinds of 
incompetent patients: formerly competent adults, never competent 
adults, or infants and children.
Briefly summarized, the differences in roles are as follows: 
First, in making decisions for formerly competent adults, the 
family’s principal role should be to help with the recognition of the 
patient as autonomous chooser, insofar as that can be achieved. 
Thus, the family may be called upon to provide information about 
the patient, such as the patient’s expressed preferences about 
health care decisions (when they are available), values, and 
approaches to making decisions. Second, in making decisions for 
never competent adults, the family’s principal role should be that 
of concerned advocate for the interests of the patient. Here, the 
family attempts to ensure that the patient’s interests are under- ' 
stood and considered. Third, in making decisions for infants and 
young children, the family’s role is to construct, as well as to 
pursue, a reasonable account of the child’s best interests. These 
differences among roles are important, and developing them will 
be the task of the first two parts of this Article.
The third part of this Article will consider how families have 
been legally included in—or banished from—health care decision 
making for the same groups of incompetent patients. Recent 
American law—at least since the potentialities of modem medical
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care have come under judicial scrutiny—has confronted a remark­
able range of situations in which the roles of families have been at 
issue. Unfortunately, however, the law has been more than a little 
unclear about how to treat families. Trends, of course, are always 
difficult to summarize, but there have been notable instances in 
which families have been allowed a great deal of latitude in 
decision making for formerly competent and never competent adult 
patients. However, families have been given little say in decision 
making for young children and particularly for infants. The law, 
in short, may be morally backwards.
Several introductory comments are important to avoid 
misunderstanding the argument which follows. First, there are 
well-known problems with family decision making for incompe­
tents, which are largely bypassed in this discussion. Families may 
have conflicts of interest. The most obvious conflicts are money 
and time; the continuing need for care may drain family finances 
or become a constant burden. But there are other kinds of conflicts 
as well, for example, emotional stress: families may prefer the 
patient’s death to the daily renewal of grief as a disabled relative 
continues to survive. Even if these conflicts of interest are 
relatively minimal, families may have difficulty shouldering the 
responsibilities of decision making. It may seem unfair—a genuine 
abdication—for health care providers to expect families to take 
responsibility for difficult decisions. Shifting the burdens of 
decision making to the family may seem particularly problematic 
if families are coming to terms with the sudden shock of illness or 
disability. It may seem downright cruel if family members have 
themselves been injured or physically affected by the events of the 
patient’s illness or injury, such as luckier (and possibly guilt- 
ridden) survivors of a devastating accident or a mother who has 
just given birth to a compromised infant. Some of these con­
cerns—time, money, or emotional stress—are likely to be present 
when families are involved in the care of any of these patients. 
Other concerns—the shock of confronting an unexpectedly disabled 
newborn, together with the mother’s own physical state—may 
apply differently to different types of patients and in different 
types of circumstances. Although this discussion does not focus on 
the general problems with family decision making, they should not 
be forgotten. Particularly severe risks of conflicts of interest, for
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example, may in certain cases justify different legal treatment of 
the family’s role. '
Second, this discussion will largely bypass issues in defining 
the family. Is "the family" defined by biological relationships and, 
if so, which ones? Is it defined by legally recognized relationships, 
including some biological relationships but also including adoption 
and marriage? Can individuals construct their own familial 
relationships, such as through surrogacy contracts or same sex 
marriages?1 State statutes authorizing family members to serve 
as surrogate decision makers, for example, typically include a 
limited list of family members in priority order.2 •
• II. W h y  t h e  Fa m il y ?
Several reasons support giving families privileged roles as 
surrogate medical decision makers. This section surveys these 
reasons, in light of three questions. First, why does the reason 
support a special role for the family as surrogate decision maker? 
Second, how strong is the reason? More precisely, does the reason 
provide just an argument for consulting the family? Or, is it strong 
enough to support a presumption in favor of the family? Is that 
presumption rebuttable or irrebuttable? Third, what is the nature 
of the family’s role? Is the family involved as a source of informa­
tion? As decision maker in terms of the patients interests? As 
patient advocate? The survey of reasons begins with patient- 
centered concerns and then turns to family-centered reasons and 
the interests of society.
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1. For a discussion of a functional approach to defining the family, see Martha 
Minow, Redefining Families: Who’s In and Who’s Out?, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 269 (1991).
2. Utah’s statute, for example, specifies the following ordered list o f surrogate 
decision makers: holder o f special power o f attorney appointed by the patient, previously 
appointed legal guardian, spouse (if not legally separated), parents or surviving parent, 
child at least 18 years old (or a majority o f reasonably available children at least 18 
years old), nearest reasonably available living relative at least 18, and legal guardian 
appointed for the purpose o f the health care decision at issue. UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2- 
1105(2Xb) (Supp. 1992). An innovative New York proposal is to allow family members 
to agree upon a designated surrogate to replace the order which would otherwise apply. 
NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN OTHERS MUST CHOOSE: 
Deciding for Patients Without Capacity app. A, at 252-53 (1992) [hereinafter New 
Y ork State Task Force].
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A. The Patient
As the theory of decision making for incompetent patients has 
been developed, two standard approaches have emerged: an 
approach that aims to reproduce the patient’s own choices and an 
approach that aims to further the patient’s best interests. The 
attempt to reproduce the patient’s own choice is seen as a 
recognition of the continued autonomy of a formerly competent 
patient and is preferred when the patient’s choices can be known 
or reconstructed. The "best interests" approach is preferred for 
patients whose choices are unknown or for patients who have 
never been able to make competent choices.3 Either of these 
approaches to decision making for incompetents requires accurate 
information, a need that may lead to the family.
1. Autonomy and Substituted Judgment
Suppose that the aim is to try to replicate what the incompe­
tent patient would have chosen. Then, one important source of 
information is the patient’s earlier directions about future 
eventualities. Only a small percentage of patients take advantage 
of formal legal mechanisms for directing health care in advance. 
However, with recent publicity and the Patient Self-Determination 
Act ("PSDA")4 this percentage may increase. If there are reasons 
to doubt the accuracy of earlier directives, if the earlier record is 
nonspecific or vague, or if there is no earlier record, information 
will be needed that permits reconstruction of what the patient 
might have chosen.5 For this reconstruction, it may be helpful to
3. See, e.g., In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 452-61 (N.J. 1987) (Handler, J., concurring) 
(examining "substituted judgment" and "best interest" principles); ALLEN E. BUCHANAN 
& Dan W. B rock, D eciding f o r  O thers: The E thics o f  S u rrogate  D ecision Making 
122-33 (1989) (discussing "best interest" standard). John Robertson has recently raised 
provocative questions about whether the choices of the formerly competent patient ought 
to be favored over the best interests of the now incompetent patient. John A. Robertson, 
Second Thoughts on Living Wills, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.-Dee. 1991, at 6.
4. Patient Self-Determination Act, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4206, § 4751, 104 Stat. 
1388,1388-115,1388-204 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.CA. §§ 1395cc, 1396a (West 1992)). 
For a discussion of difficulties with utilization of advance directives and implementation 
of the PSDA, see John La Puma et al., Advance Directives on Admission: Clinical 
Implications and Analysis o f  the Patient Self-Determination Act o f1990, 266 JAMA 402 
(1991).
5. For a discussion of some of the ethical difficulties in allowing an earlier directive
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have anecdotes of the patient working through actual or hypotheti­
cal medical decisions. More general information about the patient’s 
values, methods of assessing information, or attitudes towards 
decision making could also be utilized in the reconstruction.6
In the litigated cases that attempt to reconstruct what the 
patient would have chosen,7 families often report earlier discus­
sions with the now-incompetent patient about health care decision 
scenarios. These discussions frequently are reported as reactions 
to the illnesses of other family members or friends. For example, 
when her husband was hospitalized with cancer, Mary O’Connor 
told her daughter that "she never wanted to be in a similar
to guide a patient’s later care, see BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 3, at 152-89; Robert­
son, supra note 3, at 6-9. For a discussion of the possible vagueness of advance directives 
and a proposal for more precision, see Linda L. Emanuel & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, The 
Medical Directive: A  New Comprehensive Advance Care Document, 261 JAMA 3288
(1989). For a discussion o f physicians’ and spouses’ potential inaccuracy in predicting 
preferences of ill patients, see Allison B. Seckler et al., Substituted Judgment: How 
Accurate are Proxy Predictions?, 115 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 92, 95-97 (1991); Richard 
F. Uhlmann et al., Physicians’ and Spouses’Predictions o f Elderly Patients’Resuscitation 
Preferences, 43 J. GERONTOLOGY M115 (1988). For a discussion of advance directive 
statutes and the easy revocation of these documents, see Leslie P. Francis, The 
Evanescence o f Living Wills, 24 REAL PROP., PROB. & Tr. J. 141 (1989). To take one 
typical example of how a state handles some of these difficulties, the Utah statute 
provides both that the desires of a competent declarant override an advance directive, 
UTAH Code Ann. § 75-2-1108 (Supp. 1992), and that an advance directive can be revoked 
by oral statements of intent in the presence of a witness over 18 years of age who then 
signs a dated written instrument documenting the expression of intent. Id. § 75-2- 
l l l l( lX c ). As advance directives come into more general use, particularly if  the PSDA 
encourages patients to complete advance directives under less than ideally thoughtful 
circumstances, it can be expected that there will be more doubts about their accuracy, 
and that family members will be a likely source of these doubts.
6. See, e.g., Eric T. Juengst & Carol J. Weil, Interpreting Proxy Directives: Clinical 
Decision-Making and the Durable Power o f Attorney for Health Care, in ADVANCE 
Directives in Medicine 21-37 (Chris Hackler et al. eds., 1989).
7. The legal term characterizing this effort is "substituted judgment." See, e.g., Jobes, 
529 A.2d at 456-57 (Handler, J., concurring) (discussing theory of substituted judgment). 
Sometimes courts are confused about this test, applying it to those who have never been 
competent. For example, in Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 
370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977), the court applied the substituted judgment standard in 
deciding to withhold chemotherapy from a 67-year-old man profoundly retarded since 
birth. The Saikewicz decision has been widely criticized for confusing the purpose of sub­
stituted judgment. See BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 3, at 113-15. The pure idea of 
substituted judgment is to try to reconstruct what the patient would have chosen from 
what is known about how the patient made decisions. The surrogate decision maker, in 
exercising substituted judgment, tries to stand in for the incompetent by imaginatively 
reconstructing what the patient would have chosen from the information that is available 
about the patient. Id. at 117-22. To the extent that little information is known, this 
process becomes increasingly speculative and may be given less weight as a result. Id.
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situation and that she would not want to go on living if she could 
not ‘take care of herself and make her own decisions.’"8 After her 
own heart attack, Mrs. O’Connor also told her daughter that "‘she 
was very glad to be home, very glad to be out of the hospital, and 
hope[d] she would never have to be back in one again and would 
never want any sort of intervention[,] any sort of life support 
systems to maintain or prolong her life.’"9
Other typical examples of family reports involve discussions 
about the publicized but abstract fates of strangers. In In re 
Swan,10 a case of a seventeen-year-old in a persistent vegetative 
state after an automobile accident, the patient’s mother described 
a conversation with her son about a highly publicized termination- 
of-treatment decision. In discussing what it meant to be a 
"Vegetable,’" she explained that it meant requiring total care. 
Swan replied, "‘If I can’t be myself . . .  no way . . .  let me go to 
sleep.’"11 In a more concrete but similar account, Swan’s brother 
told of their visit to a comatose friend just eight days before his 
brother’s accident. Reacting to the visit, Swan had remarked to his 
brother that "‘I don’t ever want to get like that. . . .  I would want 
somebody to let me leave—to go in peace.’"12
Somewhat vaguer reports are found in the Jobes case. Nancy 
Jobes is described as telling her first cousin that she wouldn’t 
want "heroic measures" taken in the case of an accident and as 
telling her husband that "she would not want to be kept alive 
under Karen Quinlan’s circumstances."13 In still other cases, 
family members relate general perspectives on medical care—"she 
disliked going to doctors"14—or style of living—"Bertha Colyer 
was a very independent woman."15 Family members may also 
report religious convictions and their guidance for decisions about 
care.16
8. In re Westchester County Medical Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607, 611 (N.Y. 1988).
9. Id.
10. 569 A.2d 1202 (Me. 1990).
11. Id. at 1205.
12. Id.
13. Jobes, 529 A.2d at 442.
14. In re Welfare of Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 748 (Wash. 1983).
15. Id.
16. E.g., Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626,632 (Mass. 1986) 
(stating that surrogate decision maker "went through long and agonizing research, reflec­
tion, and prayer," and discussed decision with clergy).
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Some courts are quite willing to rely on these familial stories. 
For example, in authorizing the withdrawal of treatment from 
Bertha Colyer, the Washington Supreme Court commented: "Given 
the unanimity of the opinions expressed by Bertha’s closest kin, 
together with the absence of any evidence of any ill motives, we 
are satisfied that Bertha’s guardian was exercising his best 
judgment as to Bertha’s personal choice when he requested the 
removal of the life support system."17
Other courts, however, express doubt about the specificity or 
reliability of these familial stories as a basis for understanding 
what the patient would have chosen. The New York court, for 
example, pointed out that Mary O’Connor had not explicitly 
discussed medically assisted nutrition and hydration with her 
daughter; nor had she expressed attitudes towards pain or comfort 
care.18 In the Jobes case, the New Jersey court refused to rely on 
the family’s evidence as a basis for a reconstruction of what Nancy 
would have chosen: "All of the statements about life-support that 
were attributed to Mrs. Jobes were remote, general, spontaneous, 
and made in casual circumstances. Indeed, they closely track the 
examples of evidence that we have explicitly characterized as 
unreliable."19
Courts that insist on clear and convincing evidence of the 
patient’s wishes before a termination of treatment decision can be 
effectuated, such as New York, may be especially skeptical about 
the status of these familial reports.20 But skepticism is not 
limited to courts which insist on a high evidentiary standard; a 
California Court of Appeals, for example, has pointed out the 
unreliability of the patient’s informal statements, made perhaps 
years earlier, when constitutional rights are involved: "It would be 
a dangerously unpredictable precedent."21
Thus, when the effort is to replicate what the patient would 
have chosen and thereby recognize the patient’s autonomy, the 
reason for family involvement is the likelihood that the family will
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17. Colyer, 660 P.2d at 748.
18. 'Westchester County Medical Ctr., 531 N.E.2d at 611.
19. Jobes, 529 A.2d at 443.
20. E.g., Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W,2d 408, 424 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (stating that 
similar to Jobes, statements used to determine Nancy Cruzan’s intent are unreliable) 
(citing Jobes, 529 A.2d at 443).
21. Drabick v. Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 856 (Ct. App. 1988).
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have good information about the patient’s choices, preferences, or 
values. In these cases, the reason for family involvement is only 
as strong as the likely evidentiary value of the family’s knowledge. 
When family members are the only good sources of this kind of 
information, they may appear uniquely positioned to help in 
decision making. But this unique positioning is contingent on the 
accuracy and exclusiveness of the family’s information. Thus, the 
family’s unique position provides at best a good reason for 
consulting the family but not an irrebuttable presumption in favor 
of family involvement. On the other hand, if the patient has 
exercised a durable power of attorney to select a family member 
(or someone else) as decision maker in the case of incompetence, 
there would be a much stronger reason for recognizing the 
authority of the surrogate, rebuttable only by a showing that the 
appointment of the surrogate itself was flawed.22
2. The Patient’s Best Interests
Information about the patient’s interests is required for 
application of the best interests standard. Here, too, the family 
may have important information. Court decisions applying the 
"best interests" standard have done little to provide a general 
theoretical account of what they mean by "interests." Perhaps the 
fullest judicial account was given by the Arizona Supreme Court: 
interests involve "such objective criteria as relief from suffering, 
preservation or restoration of functioning, and qualify and extent 
of sustained life."23 The more theoretical account relied on by the 
Arizona court was provided by the President’s Commission for the 
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research: "An accurate assessment [of interests] will 
encompass consideration of the satisfaction of present desires, the 
opportunities for future satisfactions, and the possibility of 
developing or regaining the capacity for self-determination."24 The
22. For a recognition of the importance of special powers of attorney for health care, 
see Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2857-58 (1990) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring).
23. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 689 (Ariz. 1987) (en banc) (footnote 
omitted).
24. President’s Comm’n for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and 
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LlFE-SUSTAINING TREAT­
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ability to experience pleasure and the receipt of health care with 
the potential to restore function are typically regarded as in a 
patient’s interests, and the experience of pain or uncomfortably 
intrusive health care are typically regarded as not in a patient’s 
interests.25
The family may be able to provide information about the 
patient’s wants and, in some cases, about what means will help to 
satisfy them. In reported decisions, families often indicate the 
extent to which continued care is painful or disturbing to the 
patient or, on the other hand, is well tolerated. For example, from 
the age of five, Barbara Grant suffered from Batten’s disease, a 
genetic disease causing progressive neurological deterioration. Her 
mother, seeking to have life support withheld during the final 
stages of the illness, described her daughter’s dislike for taking 
medicine, using a cane, having suction tubes used on her, and her 
dislike for the medical staff.26 In another reported decision, John 
Storar was fifty-two years old, with a mental age of about eighteen 
months.27 He suffered from bladder cancer and was expected to 
live four to six months with regular blood transfusions. His 
seventy-seven-year-old mother, who lived nearby and visited him 
daily, observed that the transfusions disturbed him and requested 
to have them discontinued.
Despite the likelihood that family members will have 
information that is crucial to assessing what is in the patients 
interests, application of the best interests standard also may 
require information that is not particularly likely to be within the 
scope of the family’s special knowledge. For example, the standard 
requires an objective assessment of the benefits and risks for the 
patient of continued care, an assessment that may require quite 
technical medical understanding.28 In applying the standard, 
courts thus may give weight to medical testimony about the likely 
results of treatment. To the extent that an assessment of interests 
requires factual judgments that are beyond the family’s particular 
expertise, courts may be less likely to turn to the family and more
ment Research 135 (1983).
25. See Rasmussen, 741 P.2d at 689.
26. In re Guardianship of Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 448 (Wash. 1987) (en banc). .
27. In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 68 (N.Y. 1981).
28. See, e.g., Jobes, 529 A.2d at 457 (Handler, J., concurring) (decision maker must 
consider needs, risks, and benefits to affected person).
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likely to turn to expert sources, particularly physicians, for 
relevant information.29
In addition to their knowledge, family members may also be 
better motivated than others to be sure that standards for decision 
making—either substituted judgment or the patient’s best 
interests—are applied carefully and accurately. Family members 
may be motivated to seek out information about the patient’s 
expressed preferences. Similarly, they may be more motivated 
than others to pursue the information needed to decide what is in 
the patient’s interests—for example, information about various 
sources of financing for care or about alternative facilities for 
treatment.
The Jobes decision is an excellent example of a court’s 
reliance on the family’s care and concern for the patient:
Family members are best qualified to make substituted 
judgments for incompetent patients not only because of their 
peculiar grasp of the patient’s approach to life, but also 
because of their special bonds with him or her. Our common 
human experience informs us that family members are 
generally most concerned with the welfare of a patient. It is 
they who provide for the patient’s comfort, care, and best 
interests and they who treat the patient as a person, rather 
than a symbol of a cause.30
As the Jobes court notes, familial caring may be directed to the 
needs of the individual patient, rather than more abstractly 
towards a value such as preserving life or providing good medical 
care. Caring may also motivate families to be persistent advocates 
for the patient’s interests, doggedly insisting that the patient 
receive attention, comfort, respect, and any care that might prove 
beneficial.
In addition to their knowledge and motivation, families are 
likely to be important to the success of various forms of care for 
incompetent patients. Families are the most likely caregivers for
29. See, e.g., id., at 460 (Handler, J., concurring) (suggesting that in ambiguous 
cases, decision maker should consult doctors, government and institutional representa­
tives, and people with religious or ethical training). For a defense of this approach, see 
Michele Yuen, Comment, Letting Daddy Die: Adopting New Standards for Surrogate 
Decisionmaking, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 581, 608-631 (1992).
30. Jobes, 529 A.2d at 445 (citations omitted).
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the debilitated. Their help is also likely to be needed in imple­
menting various forms of therapy, particularly as patients are 
discharged more quickly from care facilities. For example, the 
participation of family members may be important to rehabilita­
tion programs for stroke victims or educational programs for 
disabled children. Thus, if families become invested in the 
decisions about care, these decisions are more likely to work out 
well for patients. Each of these links to the family, how­
ever—knowledge of interests, care and concern, and involvement 
in therapy—are contingent and may well not apply in specific 
family circumstances.
B. The Patienfs Future
To this point, the discussion of patient-centered reasons has 
assumed a patient with settled choices, preferences, or inter­
ests—someone who has become a developed person, although 
perhaps only to an extent limited by medical events. But some 
patients, especially young children, do not have a full range of 
established choices or even readily predictable interests. There is 
not as yet a template of choices or interests of the patient on 
which to base decisions. The template remains to be developed, if 
possible. Health care decisions, like other decisions that affect the 
fates of young children, will shape preferences and interests and 
thus will help create the person the child becomes. Decisions for 
children therefore may entail weighing options for very different 
kinds of persons and lives.
This contrast between adults and very young children is, to 
be sure, a matter of degree rather than absolute. As children 
mature, their interests become clearer and more settled. Most 
young children do have interests related to occurrent preferences, 
as well as to how they will develop, for example, interests in being 
fed or free from pain. On the other side, the interests of adults are 
open to change in the future and will to some extent be shaped by 
the medical choices that are made. Therapeutic options that result 
in loss of a limb, damage to sight or hearing, or infertility, may 
open—or close—very different futures for patients, and their 
choices and interests may shift in response. Nevertheless, for adult 
patients these choices take place against a template of already- 
shaped preferences about physical activity, music, or bearing
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children. For young children, the individualized template is far 
less clear.
This contrast between the relative open-endedness of the 
preferences of children and the relative development of the 
preferences of adults has important implications for the role of the 
family in health care decision making. The approach to adult 
decision making, as it has been developed in contemporary 
bioethics and as it was discussed in the preceding section, is 
grounded in several important assumptions of liberal theory. The 
starting place for analysis is the individual (in this case, the 
patient). A very important moral task (if not the most important 
moral task) is to respect the patient’s autonomy as far as possi­
ble.31 Autonomy is respected either by letting the patient choose, 
or by relying upon an already-developed template of values, 
preferences, interests, and choices. When autonomy, is not a 
possibility, the patient is assumed at least to have individualized 
interests that are to be the basis of decision making.
For children, in contrast, the background template is yet to 
be constructed. A theory of health care decision making must 
include an account of how the background template is to be filled 
in, including a view about the roles for parents or other family 
members. There are, of course, many different views about the 
roles of parents in shaping the preferences and interests of their 
children. One basic division is whether the claims of parents or the 
claims of children are the most fundamental to a theory of parent- 
child relationships.32 Another is the meaning and value of 
autonomy for the developing child.33 For those who would regard 
autonomy as an important value, still another issue is the role of 
parents in fostering autonomy. With respect to parent-child 
relations, perhaps the prevailing liberal views are that the claims 
of the individual child are foundational and that children should
31. The canonical liberal text in contemporary bioethics likely is THOMAS L. 
Beauchamp & James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (3d ed. 1989).
32. Perhaps most fundamentally, these views differ on whether the parents’ claims 
or the child’s claims are theoretically prior. See JEFFREY BLUSTEIN, PARENTS & 
CHILDREN: th e  ETHICS OF THE Family 104-14 (1982). It is worth noting that these 
discussions tend to consider the role of parents, rather than family members more 
generally.
33. See, e.g., WHOSE CHILD? CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHORITY, AND STATE 
POWER (William Aiken & Hugh LaFollette eds., 1980) [hereinafter WHOSE CHILD?] 
(presenting essays on relationship between child, parent, and state).
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be raised to become autonomous adults. These liberal assumptions 
ax;e severely criticized, particularly by those who doubt the 
individualism and autonomy on which they rest.34 Nevertheless, 
these assumptions are a useful starting place because they 
represent the corresponding theory about decision maldng for 
children that the prevailing liberal theory in bioethics represents 
about decision making for adults. So the aim in what follows is to 
draw out some of the implications of this liberal theory for the role 
of parents in making health care decisions for their children. The 
aim, in short, is to outline a liberal account of the role of parents 
in making health care decisions for their children, not to defend 
liberal theory more generally.
The child-centered views of parental obligations that have 
predominated in recent liberal political theory base parents’ 
obligations towards their children on a vision of what their 
children should become: autonomous adults, capable of choosing 
the kinds of lives they want to lead. Joel Feinberg describes this 
theory as the "right to an open future."35 By this, he means that 
children have rights to have certain "key options" continue to be 
available for them, such as choices of careers that fit their talents 
and dispositions, until they are able to make choices among them 
as adults. Parents, in turn, are obligated to try to create the condi­
tions that help children realize their rights to open futures. Thus, 
according to the liberal view, parents are obligated to try to 
provide their children with the sustenance, support, and education 
needed for growth to autonomous adulthood.
For its critics, perhaps the most controversial aspects of this , 
liberal view are its incompatibility with parental values and tradi­
tional forms of social life. But the theory is subject to criticism 
even on its own terms: the creation of the conditions for eventual 
self-determination may not be a value-free enterprise in itself; it 
may, by creating the conditions for one sort of life, effectively 
preclude the enjoyment of others. We might say that choices about 
children’s lives are neutral towards their futures, to the extent 
that they leave options open for later determination by the child
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34. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OP JUSTICE passim (1982).
35. Joel Feinberg, The Child's Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD?, supra 
note 33, at 126; see also BLUSTEIN, supra note 32, at 199 (asserting that parents have 
duty "to expose their children to the psychological conditions that facilitate the 
development o f their capacities for self-determination, or autonomy").
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as an adult. The extent to which creation of the conditions for self­
determination is neutral in this sense is highly controversial. For 
instance, some liberals tend to believe that this neutrality does 
and should have a relatively wide range.36 Writers more critical 
of the liberal tradition are doubtful.37
Doubts about both the possibility and the desirability of 
neutrality are clearly illustrated by controversies about education, 
and these controversies are instructive for decision making about 
health care.38 There are highly charged questions about the 
extent to which education that helps create the conditions for self­
determination is consistent with parental influence about values. 
Are parents neutral if they encourage their children to love music, 
sports, or God? Can any of these attitudes be "revoked," and, if 
not, does liberal neutrality recommend confining education to 
bloodless values that instill no passions that the child cannot later 
overthrow? Would it, for example, violate a child’s right to an open 
future to bring the child up in a very structured religion, which 
inculcates significant feelings of guilt for abandonment of the 
faith?39 To limit the child’s education in order to avoid contact 
with the "modem" world, as the Amish do?40 To encourage a 
child to pursue competitive gymnastics, a career as a concert 
violinist, or some other calling that may require an overwhelming 
commitment from an early age? To conclude that parents may not 
choose any of these pathways for a child because the choice is not 
neutral among futures imposes drastic limits on what parents may 
do for their children: they cannot create deep concerns, loves, or 
commitments that are inconsistent with an open future. If the
36. Feinberg, supra note 35, at 124-51.
37. Sharon Bishop, Children, Autonomy, and the Right to Self-Determination, in 
WHOSE CHILD?, supra note 33, at 154-76.
38. This is a problematic analogy for those who believe that one set of values governs 
education—for example, the duty to instruct children in the ways of God—but a different 
set of values governs health care decision making, such as the preservation of life at all 
costs. With views such as these, the parents are seen as agents of the values in question. 
The perspectives which include these values may, however, also see the parents as 
preferred agents for value transmission. See, e.g., The Country’s Future Is in Your House, 
WASH. Post, Aug. 20,1992, at A34 (excerpts-from Barbara Bush’s speech at Republican 
National Convention indicating that parents are most important vehicle for transmitting 
values to children).
39. Cf. James Joyce, A  Portrait of the Artist As a  Young Man (Penguin Books 
1983) (1916) (illustrating these religious conflicts from Catholic perspective).
40. Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 210-12, 236 (1972) (upholding right of 
Amish parents to remove their children from school after eighth grade).
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right to an open future is understood to require extensive neutrali­
ty among courses that cannot later be rejected, the theory seems 
implausible as a complete account of the role of parents in their 
children’s lives.
In the debates about education, however, the right to an open 
future is not understood in this pallidly neutral way. Suppose, 
then, that we try a somewhat fuller characterization of which 
future options should be kept open for a child. Three quite 
tentative suggestions can be drawn from remarks made by liberal 
theorists such as Feinberg. First, actions taken during childhood 
should not be ones that would violate the rights of the later adult. 
If adults generally enjoy political rights such as the right to vote, 
rights of personal choice such as the right to marry or to choose 
whether to bear children, or liberty rights such as freedom of 
speech, parents should not take steps during childhood that would 
violate these later rights. Thus, for example, parents should not be 
able to renounce a child’s rights of citizenship.
Second, actions taken during childhood should attempt to 
uncover and foster a reasonable measure of the child’s abilities 
and talents.41 Thus, parents should not impose educational or 
work regimes that offer the child little opportunity to discover 
talents or that ruthlessly attempt to discourage significant 
abilities.42 On the other hand, children are multifaceted and not 
all talents can be developed simultaneously; part of what is 
involved in the openness of the child’s future is the need for 
guidance and selection among various possibilities for develop­
ment. Parents may, along with their children as they become 
older, select among reasonable sets of these possibilities.
41. Feinberg, for example, links the child’s "open future" to the development of 
talents:
[T]he parents who raise their child in such a way as to promote his self-ful­
fillment most effectively will at every stage try to strengthen the basic ten­
dencies o f the child as manifested at that stage. They will give him 
opportunities to develop his strongest talents, for instance, after having en­
joyed opportunities to discover by various experiments just what those 
talents are.
Feinberg, supra note 35, at 150.
42. On these grounds, for example, Feinberg is much more doubtful about the 
permissibility of the Amish decision to forego public education after the eighth grade, 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), than about the permissibility of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses using their children to distribute pamphlets on street comers, Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). See Feinberg, supra note 35, at 129-38.
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Third, actions taken during childhood should not preclude the 
later adult from enjoying major life satisfactions, such as deep 
human relationships.43 This third suggestion is difficult to 
formulate and to balance against the second. There are certainly 
tensions between them. Sharon Bishop, for example, argues that 
education of a female child that is aimed at developing talents is 
crucial for autonomy even though it may conflict with traditional 
female roles.44 These tensions are at the heart of the dialogue 
about an education that develops understanding and intellectual 
talents, at the likely expense of deeply held communitarian values.
These three suggestions about how to understand the 
openness of the child’s future in the context of education might be 
applied to medical decision making as follows. First, decisions that 
would violate the rights of the later adult would be prohibited. For 
example, if the later adult has rights to procreate, sterilization of 
the child would violate these rights. If the later adult has rights 
to nurture her own children, compelled, abortion on an adolescent 
patient would violate those rights. Second, in making medical 
decisions, parents should try to the extent possible to take into 
account the development of reasonable groupings of children’s 
abilities and talents. They should not, for example, deny care or 
delay care when to do so carries significant risks of mortality or 
morbidity. Nor should they choose therapies that unreasonably 
risk compromising cognitive capacities or major functional 
possibilities. On the other hand, parents may legitimately weigh 
risks to one sort of capacity against risks to another—for example, 
choices between chemotherapeutic modalities that weigh an 
increase in the chance of limb salvage against sterility or hearing 
loss. Third, parents should not make decisions, if at all possible, 
that are likely to preclude important human satisfactions. For 
example, in medical decision making they should take into account 
the preservation of communicative and perceptual capacities.45
43. BLUSTEIN, supra note 32, at 199, argues that parents have twin duties towards 
their children: raising them to be capable of self-determination and promoting their self­
fulfillment.
44. Bishop, supra note 37, at 154-76.
45. For a criticism of this suggestion and defense of the view that parents should not 
be required to foster the development of life prospects that they find unacceptable, see 
William Ruddick, Parents and Life Prospects, in HAVING CHILDREN: PHILOSOPHICAL AND 
Legal Reflections on Parenthood 124-37 (Onora O’Neill & William Ruddick eds., 
1979). Ruddick gives the example of dwarf parents who very much want to raise a dwarf
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These suggestions outline the latitude of parental discretion 
in health care decision making. They would not, for example, 
require parents to prolong life if doing so would not be helpful in 
allowing the child to develop talents or experience important life 
satisfactions. Thus, to this extent, parents would be permitted to 
make quality of life judgments for their children, including 
judgments to forego treatment when the prognosis is dim for the 
child’s ability to develop talents or to experience well-being at even 
a minimal level. Parents would also be permitted to choose among 
alternate possible lives consistent with these guidelines and to 
weigh therapeutic alternatives in light of the different risks to 
functional capacities that they present. For example, parents could 
choose therapeutic options that risk death in exchange for 
significant improvements in functional status, weigh options that 
trade different kinds of compromises in functional status against 
each other (for example, surgery as against chemotherapy for 
certain types of cancers or choice of gender for a child bom with 
ambiguous gender characteristics), or weigh significant compromis­
es to well-being against other possible advantages of care.
On this understanding of the implication of liberal theory for 
parent-child relationships, parents thus have significant latitude 
in shaping the futures of their children. This latitude embodies 
choices among forms of health care that may shape quite different 
futures, including even the possibility of death. Furthermore, the 
role of parents is not simply informational or contingent; it is an 
integral part of the decision, as long as the decision is exercised in 
accord with the constraints suggested above, unless some circum­
stance disqualifies the parents as parents altogether.
C. Interests of the Family
Within patient-centered models of medical decision making, 
the interests of the family are relevant only insofar as they make 
a difference to the patient’s choices or interests. As other Articles
child and refuse medical care that would cause the child to be of normal stature. He 
concludes that the parents are not obligated to provide the care, despite the predictabili­
ty that being of normal size would open important life prospects for the child: "The 
parents . . .  are violating the child’s right to a normal life—if there is such a right. I see 
no basis for such a right, nor do I think this case requires us to look for one. If there is 
such a right, we may set against it the dwarves’ right to be parents." Id. at 133-34.
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in this symposium indicate, entirely patient-centered models may 
be increasingly regarded as myopic, but this is not the point here. 
The models of medical decision making developed in this Article 
are based largely on the interests of the patient, but it is impor­
tant to survey briefly the separate interests of family members 
because they are often among the most important factors in actual 
decision making. '
First, it is obvious that family members’ medical decisions 
may have remarkably intense and long-lasting effects on family 
emotions, relations, time, opportunities, and finances. The care of 
a debilitated relative can be a daily intrusion on marital relation­
ships, a drastic limit on career choices, or a perceived barrier to 
having (other) children. Although adoption of or reliance on 
alternative sources of care are readily proposed as alternatives, 
neither option is easily taken without emotional pain. Various 
social arrangements in the United States particularly complicate 
the burdens. For example, Medicare pays only very limited home 
health benefits,46 and there are economic difficulties in qualifying 
for Social Security disability benefits.47 If consequences for the 
family are considered relevant to health care decision making, it 
certainly seems that there will be cases in which the costs to the 
family will be so great as to outweigh any contemplated benefit of 
continued care for the afflicted family member.
Second, views about the moral importance of relationships 
may support an enhanced role of the family in medical decision 
making for incompetent family members. For example, if the 
potential for a parent-child relation is regarded as a very impor­
tant object of care, then the family ought to have a role in deciding 
about care as it affects this relationship. For those who place the 
relationship rather than the individual at the center, the family is 
integral to the process of health care decision making.
in. T h re e  D iffe r e n t  R o le s  f o r  th e  F a m ily
The patient’s choices, interests, and open future thus are 
important patient-centered characteristics that support roles for 
the family in making medical decisions for incompetent members.
46. See 42 C.F.R. § 410.10 (1991).
47. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.U00-.1182 (1992).
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When the aim of decision making is to attempt to capture or 
recapture the patient’s choices, family members frequently will be 
important sources of information. They may know of actual choices 
or be able to report discussions about desires in hypothetical 
situations. They may be able to supply important background 
information about the patient’s values or styles of decision making 
and the extent to which these have been long-lasting and consis­
tent. On the other hand, the family may have been at worst' 
estranged and at best simply uncommunicative about medical 
decision making. Thus, when there is some possibility of recon­
structing the choices of a formerly competent family member, the 
primary role for the family is to serve as a critical source of 
information about the patient.
When the aim of medical decision making is realization of the 
patient’s best interests, either because the patient’s choices cannot 
be reconstructed or because the patient has never been competent, 
the family may also be an important source of information. The 
family may have knowledge about how intensely a patient felt 
various satisfactions or how much discomfort the patient apparent­
ly suffered from illness or therapeutic intervention. On the other 
hand, a critical part of the assessment of a patient’s interests is 
understanding of the medical prognosis and alternatives for care, 
and in this respect the family is not in a privileged position. 
Because of its love and concern, however, the family may be the 
most likely agent to press for consideration—and, importantly, for 
reassessment and reconsideration—of the patient’s interests. Thus, 
when the best interests standard is the most appropriate one for 
medical decision making, the family’s principal role is as advocate 
for the patient’s interests.
Finally, when the patient’s interests have yet to be developed 
significantly, medical decisions may shape that development in 
important ways. By analogy to the role of the parent in education, 
parents may make some of these seminal health care decisions for 
their children, subject to three important guidelines. First, parents 
should not act in ways that violate the rights of the adult the child 
will become. Second, parents should try to ensure the continued 
availability of a life in accord with a reasonable range of the child’s 
talents and abilities. Third, parents should try to preserve 
important capacities for their children to experience satisfactions. 
In making medical decisions for their children, therefore, the
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parents’ role extends to shaping, as well as advocating, the 
children’s interests. This is particularly true for infants and 
younger children: as children become increasingly capable of 
shaping their own lives autonomously, the roles of family members 
increasingly shift towards their roles for adult patients.
These roles for the family—informant, advocate, and 
shaper—are supported within the predominant liberal paradigm 
of bioethics. If liberal assumptions such as the priority of the 
individual or the importance of autonomy are discarded, then 
there may be different and even stronger roles for the family.
IV. Cu r r e n t  L e g a l  A pp r o a c h e s : T h e  C o n tr a st  B e t w e e n  
A du lts a n d  Y o u n g  Ch il d r e n
The last ten years have seen remarkable statutory and case- 
law development with respect to medical decision making for 
incompetent patients. Insofar as trends are discemable, the legal 
developments seem to more clearly allow discretion for familial 
decision making when the patient is an adult than when the 
patient is a young child. This divergence seems contrary to the 
suggestions drawn from the liberal models about the ethics of 
health care decision making.
A  Adults
With respect to adults, case law has tended to allow family 
members relatively wide latitude in reconstructing patients’ 
choices. A good example is the Washington Supreme Court’s 
decision in Colyer, which relied on the family’s reconstruction of 
Bertha Colyer’s values of independence and distrust of medical 
care.48 Even the Cruzan case was ultimately resolved in accord 
with the family’s wishes.49 Despite the state’s insistence that 
there be clear and convincing evidence of the patient’s wishes, the 
trial court eventually found that the family had brought forward 
sufficient evidence to show that Nancy would not have wanted her
48. In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 748 (Wash. 1983) (en banc).
49. Diane E. Hoffman, Introduction: The Right to Die After Cruzan, 2 MD. J. 
Contemp. Legal Issues 93, 96 (1991).
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life prolonged in a persistent vegetative state by means of 
medically assisted nutrition and hydration.50
Tn addition to the court decisions, some states now also have 
statutes that authorize family members to consent to the with­
drawal of life sustaining treatment, most frequently when the 
patient is terminally ill.51 These statutes typically list family 
members in an automatic order of priority, after the patient’s own 
choice of a surrogate or a court appointed guardian. New York’s 
proposal to let family members themselves select the surrogate is 
innovative.52 Although these provisions are often part of statutes 
establishing living wills or special powers of attorney for health 
care, they typically enumerate family members by degree of 
relationship rather than by knowledge or known intimacy to the 
patient. One justification for the preset statutoiy priorities is that 
they are highly likely to mirror the justifications for reliance on 
the family, especially knowledge and caring. But there is no 
automatic requirement to ascertain whether this is so in any 
particular case. Instead, if there is significant disagreement with 
the statutory ordering of family members, the statutory alternative 
is to seek appointment of a court-appointed guardian who then 
takes priority. The most likely entity to pursue guardianship
50. Id.
51. States with family consent statutes include: Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17­
214 (Michie Supp. 1991)); Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-571 (1991)); the District 
of Columbia (D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2210 (1989)); Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.07 (West 
1986)); Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. § 327D-21 (1991)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 39-4303 (1985) 
(medical consent statute)); Illinois (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110VS, para. 851-25 (Smith-Hurd 
Supp. 1992)); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-12-4 (Bums 1990), construed in In re 
Lawrence, 579 N.E.2d 32, 41-43 (Ind. 1991)); Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.7 (West 
1989)); Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.5 (West 1992)); Maine (ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A § 5-707(b) (Supp. 1991)); Maryland (MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. 
§ 20-107(d) (Supp. 1991) (medical consent statute)); Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. § 41­
41-3 (Supp. 1991)) (medical consent statute); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-106 
(1991)); Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 449.626 (Michie 1991)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT 
ANN. § 24-7-8.1 (Michie 1986)); New York (N.Y. PUB. HEALTH Law § 2965 (McKinney 
Supp. 1992) (limited to DNR orders)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322 (1990)); 
Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 127.635 (1991)); South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34- 
12C-3 (Supp. 1992) (medical consent statute)); Texas (TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. 
§ 672.009 (West 1992)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1107 (Supp. 1992)); Virginia (VA. 
CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986 (Michie Supp. 1992)); and Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 7.70.065 (West 1992)) (medical consent statute).
52. New  York State Task Force, supra note 2, app. A, at 253.
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proceedings is the treating health care institution, motivated by 
fears of liability when family members disagree.63
B. Children
The legal situation for children is less developed and more 
diverse. Some of the earlier cases appeared to be moving towards 
the view that parents may not refuse life-saving treatment but 
have latitude to make decisions when there is some dispute about 
what is in their children’s interests. Other cases, however, gave 
parents more latitude, particularly several highly controversial 
instances in which corrective surgery was withheld from infants 
with Down’s syndrome. In the early 1980s, the Baby Doe regula­
tions took a strong stand in favor of aggressive treatment of nearly 
all newborns.54 Perhaps because of the regulations, case-law 
development was notably limited. Several states passed statutes 
codifying the Baby Doe regulations;55 in most others, the legal 
status of parental decisions to withhold or withdraw care remains 
unclear.
1. Before Baby Doe '
By the late 1970s, case law had appeared with respect to 
nontreatment decisions for infants and children. For the most part, 
the decisions involved parents who had refused standard medical 
recommendations on religious grounds.50 When there was medi­
cal agreement that the recommended care had the clear potential 
to avoid mortality or morbidity, courts generally would mandate 
it.57 Several cases left decisions within the parents’ discretion
53. Alan  Meisel, The Right to Die § 6.1-.27 (1989 & Supp. 1991)).
54. See infra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 91-101 and accompanying text.
56. See MEISEL, supra note 53, § 13.5—.6.
57. E.g., Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97, 103 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952) (holding that 
state has authority to mandate blood transfusion to preserve child’s life); State v. 
Perricone, 181 A.2d 751, 756-57 (N.J. 1962) (affirming order of blood transfusion for 
infant over Jehovah’s Witness parents’ objection); Sampson v. Taylor (In re Sampson), 
278 N.E.2d 918, 919 (N.Y. 1972) (holding religious objection by parent to blood 
transfusion was not bar to court order in neglect proceeding when transfusion was 
necessary to success of required surgery); Application of Brooklyn Hospital, 258 N.Y.S.2d 
621, 623 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (granting hospital administrator authority to consent to child’s 
blood transfusion when child was seriously endangered and parents objected to
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when the court perceived significant dispute about the possible 
efficacy of the care or likely risks to the child.58 Although rela­
tively sparse, these cases seem to track the liberal view sketched 
above:59 parents may choose among reasonable courses of action 
in shaping their children’s futures, but they may not take 
avoidable risks of cutting off significant capacities or even life 
itself.
The relatively undeveloped state of the law was highlighted 
by two much discussed cases in 1979. In Massachusetts, the Chad 
Green case involved a parental decision to discontinue chemother­
apy in favor of giving laetrile to their young son with leukemia.60 
Chad Green was twenty months old when his disease was first 
diagnosed; the treating physicians recommended chemotherapy 
with an apparent prognosis of a better-than-fifiy-percent likelihood 
of five-year survival. The risks of chemotherapy, as described by 
the physicians, were relatively benign, easily managed side effects 
such as constipation. The parents, however, were very upset by 
the way the chemotherapy made their son feel and discontinued 
it.
The court ordered the parents to provide the care,61 but the 
reasoning in the case was less than fully clear. In the first 
hearing, in which the state sought to compel continued therapy, 
the court balanced three factors: the natural rights of parents, the 
best interests of the child, and the interests of the state.62 The 
factors were presented as a list, without a theoretical account of 
which should predominate or why. The court’s decision rested on 
the conclusion that each of the factors pointed in the same 
direction. The rights of the parents, in the court’s view, were to be 
treated as a trust which did not extend to the right to risk the life
transfusion on religious grounds); In re Clark, 185 N.E.2d 128, 132 (Ohio C.P. 1962) 
(stating that when child’s right to live and parents’ religious beliefs collide, former is 
paramount).
58. E.g., In re Seiferth, 127 N.E.2d 820, 824 (N.Y. 1955) (allowing parents to decide 
about child’s cleft palate surgery); In re Hudson, 126 P.2d 765 (Wash. 1942) (discussing 
amputation of grossly deformed arm to which parents objected because of risks of 
surgery). It may be significant that these are older cases, and the courts were less 
inclined to view medical care itself in a favorable light.
59. See supra notes 31-45 and accompanying text.
60. Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (Mass. 1978).
61. Id. at 1062.
62. Id. at 1061-67.
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or health of the child.63 The best interests of the child would 
clearly be served by therapy: the chemotherapy had minimal side 
effects (so the court found) and offered a good chance of cure; 
moreover, there were no other available alternatives.64 And the 
state’s interest was to protect the child.65 In a later hearing, the 
court used the same analysis to order the parents to discontinue 
therapy with laetrile and vitamins in addition to ordering the 
chemotherapy.66 This second conclusion illustrates the difficulty 
with the court’s approach because the evidence about the risks of 
the supplemental therapy was quite thin, and the parents’ hopes 
were simply set aside.
On the other hand, balancing the parents’ rights against the 
child’s interests can also lead to problematic latitude for parents. 
In a New York case parallel to the Chad Green fact situation, the 
court permitted the parents of a seven-year-old with Hodgkin’s 
disease to refuse chemotherapy in favor of laetrile on the recom­
mendation of a licensed New York physician who specialized in 
nutrition.67
The difficulty with listing the parents’ rights along side the 
child’s interests is starkly illustrated by a second decision in 1979, 
the California case of Phillip Becker. Bom with Down’s syndrome 
and a heart defect, Phillip Becker, at twelve years old, faced the 
prospects of increasing shortness of breath and ultimate lung 
failure by early adulthood if he did not have surgery to repair the 
heart defect.68 Although the surgery had been recommended for 
several years, Phillip’s parents refused their consent. The State 
petitioned for Phillip to be declared a dependent child of the court 
for the purpose of surgical consent. Despite Phillip’s natural 
parents’ failure to maintain extensive contact with him,69 the 
court rejected the State’s petition and allowed the parents to
63. Id. at 1063.
64. Id. at 1065.
65. Id. at 1066-67.
66. Custody of a Minor, 393 N.E.2d 836, 845-46 (Mass. 1979). The court concluded 
that the laetrile and vitamin therapy put the child at risk of low-grade cyanide poisoning 
and brain damage. Id. at 845. By the time the court actually heard the case, the parents 
had fled with the child. Id. at 838 n.l.
67. Saratoga County Dep’t of Social Servs. v. Hofbauer {In re Hofbauer), 393 N.E.2d 
1009, 1012-15 (N.Y. 1979).
68. Bothman v. Warren (In re Phillip B.), 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 50 (Ct. App. 1979).
69. Herbert H. v. Warren B. (Guardianship of Phillip B.), 188 Cal. Rptr. 781, 786-87 
(Ct. App. 1983).
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refuse the surgery.70 The court began its analysis with the 
autonomy rights of the parents:
Inherent in the preference for parental autonomy is a commit­
ment to diverse lifestyles, including the right of parents to 
raise their children as they think best. Legal judgments 
regarding the value of childrearing patterns should be kept to 
a minimum so long as the child is afforded the best available 
opportunity to fulfill his potential in society.71
At the same time, according to the court, the state has an interest 
in protecting children, and may thus interfere in family matters 
"to safeguard the child’s health, educational development and 
emotional well-being."72 The trial court denied the • petition 
because the evidence did not show clearly and convincingly that 
the surgeiy was necessary to safeguard Phillip’s health.73 In 
affirming the trial court’s decision, the appellate court agreed that 
the clear and convincing standard was proper.74 Testimony at the 
trial court included evidence that the surgery was somewhat more 
risky for Down’s syndrome patients than for other children (for 
whom it had a five to ten percent mortality risk), that there was 
the possibility of complications requiring a pacemaker, and that 
Phillip already might have suffered some lung damage from his 
heart condition. The appellate court characterized the trial court 
as balancing the benefits and risks of the surgery for Phillip,75 a 
characterization that has been criticized as slanted towards the 
parents’ conclusions.76
Intermittently throughout the 1970s, reports appeared about 
parental decisions to withhold care from ill newborns. A study of 
medical practice indicated that a number of infants with Down’s 
syndrome or neural-tube defects died after nontreatment deci­
70. Phillip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. at 52.
71. Id. at 51.
72. Id.




76. See generally Kathleen M. Heydon, Note, Guardianship o f Phillip B.: Nonparents’ 
Right to Custody in California, 18 LOY. LA. L. REV. 779 (1985) (discussing history of 
Phillip Becker and analyzing court decisions).
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sions.77 Several highly publicized parental decisions to refuse 
care—especially the "Baby Doe" cases—brought the issue into the 
political forum. Several factors may have combined to explain the 
aggressiveness of the Baby Doe regulations: the growth of the 
right to life movement, the Reagan presidency, the uncertainty of 
case law, and changes in attitudes and understanding about 
Down’s syndrome patients.78
2. The "Baby Doe" Regulations
Promulgated first under section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act,79 and then under the Child Abuse Amendments,80 the Baby 
Doe regulations set very stringent limits for decisions with respect 
to handicapped newborns. The regulations base decision making 
about care almost entirely on the likelihood of whether treatment 
will contribute to the survival of the impaired newborn. The 
regulations absolutely prohibit any consideration of likely quality 
of life for the infant.
Under the regulations, there are only three circumstances in 
which care may be withheld from a handicapped newborn:
(1) If, in reasonable medical judgment, the child is chronically 
and irreversibly comatose;81
(2) If, in reasonable medical judgment, the care would only 
prolong dying—that is, it would not be effective in ameliorating all 
of an infant’s life-threatening conditions or otherwise would be 
futile in terms of survival;82 or
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77. Raymond S. Duff and A.G.M. Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the 
Special-Care Nursery, 289 NEW ENG. J. MED. 890, 892-94 (1973).
78. For a description of the context, see MEISEL, supra note 53, § 14.6-.7.
79. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394 (1973) (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (Supp. 1992)).
80. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749-64 (1984) 
(codified in scattered sections of title 29 U.S.C.A). The regulations were originally 
promulgated under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act in response to two highly publicized 
cases of withholding of medical treatment for handicapped newborns. See Bowen v. 
American Hosp. Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 617-23 (1986). The Supreme Court held that the 
regulations had been improperly promulgated under the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 647. 
A  second round of "Baby Doe" regulations, adopted under the Child Abuse Amendments, 
require states to protect infants with life-threatening conditions from "medical neglect" 
in exchange for receiving child abuse prevention funding. See 45 C.F.R. § 1340.1—.20 & 
app. (1991).
81. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(b)(2)(i) (1991).
82. Id. § 1340.15(b)(2Xii).
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(3) If, in reasonable medical judgment, the care would be 
virtually futile in terms of survival and under the circumstances 
would be inhumane.83
In addition, there are no circumstances under which nutrition, 
hydration, or comfort care may be withheld, despite the infant’s 
prognosis.84 ,
These regulations impose remarkable limits on family 
decision making with respect to handicapped newborns. They 
express a commitment to the preservation of life in nearly all 
circumstances, which is clearly at odds with the liberal account 
sketched above. They do not allow parents to consider whether 
death is preferable to continued existence with truncated capaci­
ties, except in the case of chronic coma. Nor do the regulations 
allow parents to forego inhumane treatment, unless it would be 
virtually futile in terms of survival.
The Baby Doe regulations apply to states that choose to 
receive federal funding for their programs to prevent child abuse. 
In order to receive the funding, states are required to have 
statutoiy definitions of child abuse, including medical neglect, that 
roughly track the regulations.85 A few states have chosen to 
forego the funding.86
3. The Current Confusion
Case law after the Baby Doe regulations is very limited. 
Three reported appellate decisions have involved parental requests 
to withdraw care.87 In each case, the patient was an infant, 
chronically comatose, and had no likelihood of recovering any 
cognitive function. In all of the cases, the court permitted discon­
tinuation of the care. In one case, the court specifically described 
the discontinuation as permissible because the infant was both 
irremediably comatose and "terminally ill,1 despite indications that 
the infant could live from one to five years with aggressive
83. Id. § 1340.15(b)(2Xiii).
84. Id. § 1340.15(b)(2) & app.
85. Id. § 1340.14(b).
86. See Terry J. Barnett, Baby Doe: Nothing to Fear But Fear Itself, 10 J. 
Perinatology 307,310 (1990).
87. In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); In re 
L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716 (Ga. 1984); In re P.V.W., 424 So. 2d 1015 (La. 1982).
HeinOnline -- 1992 Utah L. Rev. 887 1992
888 UTAH LAW REVIEW [1992: 861
supportive therapy.88 Ia second case, the court concluded specifi­
cally that the state’s "Baby Doe" law permitted the discontinuation 
of therapy in cases of irreversible coma.89 Meisel has argued that 
these decisions are not limited to allowing parental discretion 
when the child is terminally ill and comatose and that the 
situation for children appears to be developing in parallel to the 
situation for adults.90 The utter paucity of cases involving chil­
dren, however, together with the quite explicit language in these 
cases about the child’s comatose and terminal condition, suggest 
that Meisel’s conclusion is unduly optimistic.
Indeed, state statutes also appear to leave parents and the 
health care profession in uncertainty about whether parents have 
the power to discontinue care in cases that do not meet the strict 
Baby Doe criteria (or their analogues for older children). Some 
states give parents the power to consent to health care for their 
children but are silent about whether this includes the power to 
make nontreatment decisions.91 A number of states define child 
abuse or neglect generally to include the failure to provide needed 
medical care.92 Some explicitly provide that religiously motivated 
failure to seek care is not criminal child abuse.93 Yet none of 
these state child abuse statutes have dealt with whether nontreat­
ment decisions in cases of medical disagreement or uncertainly 
should be viewed as the failure to provide needed care.
Five states have spelled out explicit limits on the power of 
parents to discontinue care.94 One of these statutes, Minnesota’s, 
specifically tracks the Baby Doe regulations.95 Louisiana prohibits 
any decision to deprive a child of nutrition, hydration, oxygen, or 
comfort care with the intent to cause or allow the death of the
88. Barry, 445 So. 2d at 370-71.
89. P.V.W., 424 So. 2d at 1021-22.
90. MEISEL, supra note 53, § 13.7—.8.
91. E.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 25.8 (West 1982); UTAH Code Ann . § 76-14-5(4)(a) (1983) 
(malpractice statute).
92. E.g., A la. Code § 26-14-1(2) (1986); A laska Stat. § 47.10.010(2)(B) (1990); U tah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-ll0(l)(d ) (1990).
93. E.g., Ala . Code § 26-14-1(2) (1986); ARK. Code Ann . § 5-27-221(c) (Michie 1987); 
Cal . Penal Code § 11165.2 (West 1992); Mass Ann. Laws ch. 273, § 1 (Law. Co-op. 
1992).
94. See infra notes 95-101 and accompanying text (discussing the five states’ limits 
on parents’ power to terminate care).
95. MINN. Stat. Ann . § 260.015(5) (West 1992).
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child.96 Louisiana also prohibits the intentional deprivation of 
care that is "necessary to attempt to save the life of the child in 
the opinion of a physician exercising competent medical judgment," 
with three exceptions: profound and irreversible coma, a condition 
that will be terminal despite "every appropriate medical treat­
ment," or care with potential risks that outweigh the potential 
benefits for survival.97 Louisiana is the only state with a specific 
provision for parents to execute directives to withdraw or withhold 
care for ill children when the child’s condition falls within the 
statutory provisions.98 Like the Baby Doe regulations, Louisiana’s 
statute asserts a preference for the preservation of life except 
when aU cognitive capacity has been lost. Two states, Rhode 
Island and Indiana, provide that parents may not withhold 
nutrition, medical treatment, or surgical intervention to a 
handicapped child if that care is generally provided to similarly 
situated children without handicaps.99 Finally, Arizona requires 
parents to provide medically necessary treatment for their children 
but exempts care that is not necessaiy to save life or that will only 
prolong the process of dying.109
Another entirely uncharted area in health care decision 
making for children is the roie of family members other than 
parents. Unlike the family consent statutes for adults, the statutes 
described above generally deal only with parents or guardians. 
Meisel reports that in practice when parents are not available to 
make decisions for their children, attending physicians turn to 
other available family members, much as is done for adults. But 
there is no legal authority for this practice, either in case law or 
statute, and Meisel cites none.101
V . C o n c l u sio n
Thus, the legal picture of the role of families in health care 
decision making is quite different for children than for adults. For
96. La. Children’s Code art. 1553 {Wes.t Supp. 1992).
97. Id. art. 1554(1M3).
98. See id. art. 1557.
99. IND. Code Ann . § 31-6-4-3(0 (Bums Supp. 1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-ll-3(b)
(1990).
100. ariz. Rev. stat. Ann. § 36-2281 (1986).
101. Meisel, supra note 53, § 13.3.
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adults, the law is increasingly authorizing family members to act 
for incompetent relatives. For children, the law is far more diverse. 
Parents are required to provide necessary medical care for their 
children, and in some states, they are specifically authorized to 
consent to health care on their children’s behalf, but what these 
provisions mean is unclear. Case-law development has been 
largely cut off in the wake of the right-to-life perspective of the 
Baby Doe regulations. Other family members are almost entirely 
left out of the legal picture.
Yet if the liberal view of health care decision making is of 
interest—and, whatever its merits, it is the predominant view in 
bioethics today—this legal picture is backwards. Within this 
liberal framework, the roles of families for adult patients are 
principally reporting and implementing the patient’s own choices 
or advocating for the patient’s best interests. The role of parents 
in making decisions for their children, however, may extend to 
decisions which, within limits, shape their children’s futures. Yet, 
under current law, families are given greater latitude in decision 
making for incompetent adults than for their children. Perhaps 
this conclusion shows that the liberal picture itself is flawed. Or 
perhaps it shows that the intervention of the Baby Doe regulations 
has unfortunately truncated development of legal understanding 
of the authority of parents to make health care decisions for their 
children.
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